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Abstract: The article argues the thesis according to which the problem of the 
foundation of human rights is not well formulated in the classic debate on it. The 
reason is that there are different kinds of foundations, depending on the different 
concepts of human rights, but also in consideration of the different aspects of 
their practice. The question is then which foundation fits with a notion of human 
rights as a legal and social practice. The second part is dedicated to the analysis 
of the idea that the practice of human rights is part of the current jus gentium. It 
aims at showing the implications of that relationship in terms of their appropriate 
legal grounds. 
 




Abstract: L’articolo sostiene la tesi secondo cui il problema della fondazione dei 
diritti umani non è ben formulato nel classico dibattito sul tema. La ragione è che 
vi sono tipi diversi di fondazione, a seconda dei diversi concetti di diritti umani, 
ma pure in considerazione dei diversi aspetti della pratica dei diritti. La questione 
è allora quale fondazione vada bene per la nozione di diritti umani come pratica 
legale e sociale. La seconda parte è dedicata all’analisi dell’idea che la pratica 
dei diritti umani sia parte dell’attuale jus gentium. Si propone di mostrare le 
implicazioni di questa relazione per quanto riguarda il carattere giuridico dei diritti 
umani. 
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Introduction. Theoretical vs. Practical Foundation 
 
We are used to thinking that how we shape the foundation of human 
rights will depend on the ethical and philosophical background conceptions, those 
views labelled by Rawls as “comprehensive doctrines”. Therefore, it has been for 
all of us a great welcome result that—notwithstanding an insurmountable ethical 
pluralism, some degree of convergence on the subject of human rights had been 
reached—whether this was the outcome of a lucky overlapping consensus or an 
agreement on the fundamental values of human life and the need for them to be 
politically and legally protected. I am not planning to question the validity of such 
an observation. However, I would like to shed light on one of its weaknesses, or 
anyway an important element that tends to be overlooked by such a description: 
the way we structure the foundations of human rights is determined to a great 
extent by how we understand and conceive them. Therefore, it may be the case 
that the supposed practical convergence is in fact the result of a 
misunderstanding on the correct interpretation of what human rights are. We may 
refer to the same object, but oftentimes we move from a different interpretation—
sometimes a very different one, of what that object is. 
We must not forget that those—like Jacques Maritain, who 
observes that agreement on human rights is reached insofar as we do not 
question its whys—also add that for those rights to be granted protection in 
practice, a common practical conception is needed: there must be an agreement 
on a hierarchy of values, a shared philosophy of human life understood not as a 
speculative, but a pragmatic view.3 We have to find the genuine practical 
foundation of human rights in this shared “philosophy of life”. As a result, the issue 
of the foundation of human rights takes two different lines: the theoretical or 
speculative one, which calls into question the comprehensive doctrines involved 
or the whys of the rights; and the pragmatic one, which deals with the shared and 
common justifications of the practice in its actual implementation. However, in 
both cases, one must need to clarify first what human rights are. 
                                                 
3 “Pour que les peuples s’entendent sur la manière de faire respecter effectivement les droits de 
l’homme il faudrait qu’ils aient en commun, si implicitement que ce soit, je ne dis pas une même 
conception spéculative, je dis au moins une même conception pratique de l’homme et de la vie, 
une même philosophy of life, s’il m’est permis d’employer pour une fois le mot philosophie à la 
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Although this is quite an obvious observation, it has a double effect: 
it makes the foundational issue simpler, while at the same time it makes it also 
more complicated. Simplification is the result of avoiding many controversies over 
the foundation, acknowledging that different issues are in question in different 
cases. However, other issues get more complicated, insofar as the supposed 
convergence on the rights is compromised, as soon as it is made clear that by 
referring to them, we often mean different things. 
It may be objected that the background conception is anyway what 
shapes our understanding of human rights. This is not only a possibility but is 
rather what often happens. However, if this were the only option, then there could 
not be any dialogue between different conceptions: each one of us would be 
isolated between the four walls of our conception of human life, without any door 
or window giving them access to the outside world. By contrast, culture generates 
forms of shared life and social relationships that have their own identity 
independently from the intentions of those who have contributed and cooperated 
to their coming into existence. These are undoubtedly human creations that are 
made of conventions, customs, common ways of doing and acting, but they are 
not fully under the control of those who take part in social interaction, and they 
rather often develop spontaneously and in unexpected ways. Human rights are 
to be classified under this category of objects. 
When American colonists declared all human beings to be equal in 
rights, clearly they did not have in mind their black slaves, nor it was the then 
prevailing comprehensive doctrines—notwithstanding their religious character— 
that were leading to the abolition of slavery. By contrast, it was the same internal 
rationale of the rights that was claiming the doctrine to be adjusted or reviewed. 
Not always human rights are what we would like them to be, or what our 
anthropological and ethical views indicate they are. Quite the opposite, human 
rights work as a testing ground for our conception of the good life. 
The assumption that human rights are a cultural object, to be 
acknowledged and described before any investigation on its foundations, does 
not necessarily lead to relativistic conclusions. Not everything which is part of a 
culture is, just for that reason, good. Therefore, not all human rights are good just 
because people see them as good. We still have to deal with the critical character 
of the foundational issue, that is what really matters. Human creations—by 
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contrast to divine ones—cannot derive from nothing, but always move their steps 
from some presuppositions, that in the end determine their standards of 
correctness. If the human rights practice develops along a certain path, this does 
not mean that they are not subject anymore to ethical scrutiny or public debate: 
it will always be a matter of deciding what is due, for the protection of human 
dignity. In this respect, human rights are human beings’ duties towards other 
human beings. It is not true—as some people argue—that the ethics of rights can 
do without any reference to duties, or as a matter of fact, has got along without 
them. Nonetheless, it is true that such ethics relegate the duties to a subordinate 
or derivative role.4 
Therefore, the foundational issue deals with two different tasks, to 
be distinguished: the issue of the nature of those rights in general, and the issue 
of the justification of every single category of rights. This is strictly speaking a 
matter of distinguishing them, rather than isolating one from the other: indeed, it 
is clear that our conception of the rights’ nature weighs in the justification of every 
single category of rights. However—as mentioned above, it is also clear that we 
would not be able to discuss the nature of those rights without taking into account 
their already existing and changing cultural existence. It is exactly this “nature” or 
“factual matter” that needs first to be accounted for, renouncing to any attempt of 
dissolving it into an ontological foundation—aimed at finding an original 
(metaphysical or empirical) source of those rights, or in a gnoseological 
foundation—to be found in self-evident truths or compelling arguments. Under 
this perspective, the foundational theories of human rights sound hopelessly 
abstract and not very enlightening.5 
 
 
1. Human Rights as a Process of Positivization 
 
At the end of the day, if we want to summarize the complex and 
articulated debate on the foundation of human rights, we must acknowledge that 
it still relies solidly on the original dichotomy: are rights recognized or rather 
granted? They are the result of the recognition of the natural rights of human 
                                                 
4 See, in general, Viola (2000), chapters VII and VIII. 
5 See Viola (2000), chapter XI, for a general summary on foundational theories. 
5 
 
Latin American Human Rights Studies, v. 1 (2021) 
 
beings, or they rather derive from human will and political institutions? Until this 
dilemma will be sorted out, nobody will be able to give an adequate description 
of the nature of human rights. 
We should start by observing that human rights, unlike natural rights 
(VIOLA, 2012), are positive rights, not only because they are included in official 
legal documents, starting with the Universal Declaration of 1948, but also 
because they are actually put into practice, i.e. protected by the courts and 
supported by widespread national and international consensus. However, their 
abovementioned positive character must be read dynamically, unlike the static 
and accomplished fashion under which the law has been traditionally (and 
mistakenly) seen. That is why I much prefer referring to a “process of 
positivization”. Human rights are identified by such a process.  
The process of positivization allows the determination of something 
pre-existent, and that is itself the result of a previous determination. Clearly, there 
must be a starting point, or beginning of the whole process. However, such a 
starting point, at the time in which it is apprehended and expressed through the 
practical reason, to a certain extent becomes specified, inevitably loses some of 
its original potentials, and becomes itself the starting point of further 
determinations. Through such a process, practical principles become part of 
human history and culture and distance themselves from nature, which anyway 
will always play a role as a backup resource as well as a limit. 
It is important for the nature of these determinations to be made 
clear, as they must not be understood either as arbitrary acts of will or as 
necessary logical deductions, i.e. a sort of forced outcome. Rather, they are the 
result of interpretation and argumentation, often deliberations, where a choice is 
made among many possible solutions, all of them legitimate. We do not face a 
choice between good and bad, but between more or less good, adequate, 
profitable options. As it is known, in the field of practical reason often we do not 
have one right answer, also in consideration of the inevitable influence of 
changing circumstances. In short, to grasp the nature of these determinations, 
one must reject the rigid separation between intellect and will, as it is strenuously 
defended by Kelsen.6 
                                                 
6 See Viola (2017).  
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The human rights path is very articulated. These are the different 
stages towards their development: values-principles-norms. Human rights 
originate as values owned by the human person, and they ground a number of 
demands for justice; further to this stage, they become legal principles to allow 
the values to be put into practice in a social context; they generate norms whose 
content is the attribution of legal powers and the imposition of legal duties, in 
order for the rights to be claimed and protected.7 
If we ask ourselves where exactly those rights have to be located, 
the answer is that the concept of a human right is fully implemented only through 
the entire sequence. Values are overriding reasons, but not yet rights, insofar as 
they do not affect human relations yet; legal principles are a social and legal 
engagement and commitment towards the dignity of the human person, and they 
create human relations; norms are legal instruments for implementing those 
rights, and without them, any entitlement to rights is just a rhetorical exercise.8 
Jurists start from this last stage and investigate what is the right in 
question, but this legal inquiry leads them to go back through the whole sequence 
and get to the value, that express the reasons supporting the same right, by this 
way obtaining a better understanding of the kind of legal powers ascribed and 
how they should be exercised. In fact, powers and duties must be only those 
strictly necessary for the right to be effective. Insofar as jurists are, by definition, 
in the first place interested in legal norms and remedies, it is normal for them to 
think that these rights are nothing else than the result of a transformation of 
certain remedies into substantive legal norms. By contrast, they are rather the 
result of a transformation of certain normative reasons through norms into 
procedural legal tools, aimed at rendering justice to those individuals. Rights are 
authentically understood when one shifts from understanding them as powers to 
understanding them as ends. 
Therefore, we must resist any temptation of delving into an inquiry 
into what element in this process should represent the essential core of human 
rights, able to define them as a concept. Human rights are defined on the basis 
of their process of positivization as a whole. 
 
                                                 
7 See Zagrebelsky (2002). 
8 See Viola (2014). 
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2. Human Rights as Natural Rights 
 
Some people argue for this definition of human rights, grounding it 
in the fundamental values characterizing human dignity, and state that human 
rights are inherent to human beings as such. This view is rooted in the Preamble 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and its article 1, stating that all 
human beings are “born” free and equal.9 Each one of us is entitled to these 
rights, just because we are humans. But this equates to seeing human rights as 
natural rights, as they were depicted by the paradigm of Enlightenment. It is true 
that the text of the abovementioned Declaration contains quite a lot of the natural 
rights jargon, as this was the only one available at the time in which the human 
rights practice started to take shape. It is anyway obvious that there is a family 
resemblance between the two traditions of rights: history always consists of a 
process of transforming the past.10 But the human rights practice has developed 
along lines that are different from those of natural rights. It is not just a matter of 
taking some distance from the essentialism that characterizes natural rights;11 we 
must acknowledge that human rights are a conceptual novelty. 
At this stage, we must ask ourselves why it has been deemed 
necessary the creation of a new list of rights, judged to be an inviolable shield for 
human dignity. What has pushed towards a further determination of these 
principles? In my view, this question has got a simple answer, which nonetheless 
has itself a number of implications that are much more complex than we usually 
think them to be. 
It is evident that there has been a clear willingness to start a new 
process of positivization, aimed at warranting a full implementation of those 
rights. Full implementation understood both in the sense of a more and more 
detailed identification of the subjects in charge of protecting those rights and in 
the sense of a more and more encompassing provision of legal and political 
remedies. True, the Universal Declaration is nothing but a soft law instrument. It 
                                                 
9 See, for instance, Morsink (2009). 
10 For a different history of rights, that takes into account this on-going process of reconsidering 
the tradition, see Davidson (2012). 
11 Morsink (2009) argues that this would be enough for distinguishing natural rights from human 
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does not include any sanction. However, it does ascribe to each single signatory 
state the responsibility for protecting human dignity, in front of their own citizens 
and the whole international community, and this is the first step for human rights 
to be implemented. If this were not the case, the Declaration would not be, strictly 
speaking, a legal instrument at all, but only a pious and compassionate tribute to 
the victims of the Holocaust—in line with the hidden wishes and intentions of 
some of its drafters. 
The tragedy of the Holocaust, which (at an emotional level) 
represented the first trigger towards the practice of human rights, awakened 
human souls not only with regard to the scars left on everything human but also 
concerning the ascription of individual responsibility for those crimes and the 
inadequacy of the legal remedies offered by the pre-constitutional legal orders. 
As a matter of fact, a proper moral conscience not only makes you discern good 
from bad, but also allows you to feel indignant and, as a result of it, urges you to 
act. If we want the epistemological dimension of human rights to be rooted in the 
conscience of humanity, we cannot but see it always under the lenses of practical 
reason, i.e. a form of knowledge that is functional to acting. What I mean is that 
the implementation of human rights is already in nuce at the time of their primal 
stage of apprehension. 
Two world wars have shown that the most serious breaches of 
human rights have been perpetrated by states. Therefore, the Universal 
Declaration and the subsequent International Covenants address the states, first 
subjects called to fulfil the duty of protecting those rights in any possible way. 
These are not simply moral duties—let alone supererogatory acts. Rather, their 
respect is a strictly legal requirement and they must be given full effectiveness. 
When these duties are not fulfilled, I would not argue—as Luigi Ferrajoli does—
that there are legal gaps in the legal system as a whole, but rather that a 
commitment made by the law has not been fulfilled, or a legal remedy has not 
been granted, without any justification for this specific lack of protection. 
The path of human rights shows that they are not only threatened 
by the states, but also by concentrations of political and economic power. 
Moreover, the responsibility to protect them is now assigned also to international 
organizations and the international community as a whole, although any specific 
ascription of individual duties is more and more complex and uncertain. At any 
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rate, this allows us to distinguish even more clearly human rights from natural 
rights. 
Natural rights are conceived as having a universal entitlement or 
category of beneficiaries, not as addressed to a universal category of obliged 
subjects. They must be internally respected by each state, only insofar as every 
single social covenant has conferred them powers and duties relating to their 
protection. Therefore, it is the same people who are entitled to those rights, that 
end up imposing the government a responsibility to protect them, i.e. creating 
special duties stemming from the status of citizenship itself.12 This is not the case 
for human rights. 
Human rights practice stems from a covenant between states, 
focusing on their joint recognition of their own duties towards human beings as 
such. The actors are not the individuals entitled to those rights, but the obliged 
entities, i.e. the states and step by step the international community as a whole; 
entitled are not the citizens, but each human being, simply in virtue of being 
human. They are not special duties, such as those stemming from citizenship 
status, but general ones, towards mankind as such, and they are structured as a 
basic universal undertaking of responsibility, from everybody towards 
everybody.13 It has been powerfully observed that “human rights are standards 
for domestic institutions whose satisfaction is a matter of international concern”.14 
The same cannot be said with regard to the natural rights tradition, as in this case 
whether they are implemented or not is an internal matter of every single state 
that may have recognized them. 
Therefore, human rights assign to every instance of human life a 
value that everybody—first of all national and international institutions and, more 
generally, political and economic powers, must acknowledge.15 Transforming 
them into legal rights allows—as observed by Hart—the ascription of rights and 
responsibilities. The international practice of human rights is based on the idea 
that the responsibility to protect and respect human rights is borne not only by 
every single state and by the international community as a whole, but also by all 
                                                 
12 For a critical inquiry into the dogma of the preference for the national community, and the view 
in accordance to which equality exists only in the domain of a political community, see Trujillo 
(2007). 
13 True, also the American and French declarations had a universal character, but they had just 
a domestic scope, and they were self-imposed obligations—not international covenants.  
14 See Beitz (2009, p. 128). 
15 See Benhabib (2004). 
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those powers that could potentially threaten as well as protect human dignity. 
This means that such a practice tends to acquire a cosmopolitan character. 
Indeed, universal legal responsibility is a principle of implementation that matches 
the universality of human rights, taken seriously.16 This is a feature that is fully 




3. Human Rights as Institutional Rights 
 
On the other side, it is argued that, because human rights are fully-
fledged positive rights, they only exist insofar as they comply with all necessary 
conditions required for them to have full legal effect. In other words, the law must 
identify who is going to have the legal duty of respecting and protecting them, 
which sanctions and remedies are envisaged, and which rules of procedure 
before courts are going to be applied. If any of this is missing, then we are in front 
of just nominal rights, unrealistic claims, wishful thinking, or, perhaps, moral 
reasons which do not have strict legal value, like those underlying the so-called 
“moral rights”. In such a context, proclaiming a universal responsibility is not so 
different from stating that nobody is responsible for not respecting human rights. 
This line of reasoning has been rightly targeted for falling into the 
fallacy of implementation. “To commit the fallacy of implementation is to say that 
without such (obviously desirable) practices and customs human rights do not 
exist” (MORSINK, 2009, p. 48). As a consequence, if society does not provide 
any legal remedy for the protection of rights, then that society does not recognize 
any human rights, insofar as they must be not only justified claims, but justified 
claims protected by the law (MARTIN, 1993, p. 84). As it can be easily observed, 
this line of thought locates the conceptual core of human rights in the will 
manifested by the laws regulating them, and not in a sort of pre-legal inherence 
of them in the human being as such, or supposed natural rights. 
It is clear that, under such an institutional conception of human 
rights, positivity is understood as those rights having a full status of determination, 
                                                 
16 The important role played by a conception of universal responsibility for human rights has been 
recently highlighted by Pope Benedict XVI (2009), n. 43. 
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not as being partially determined step by step through a process of positivization. 
Strictly speaking, such a full determination would be accomplished only when 
each concrete right is specified, whether through its unimpeded exercise or 
further to a court decision. As we know, lists of rights cannot but have very 
abstract features, and they are still undetermined to a great extent: that is why 
we can only see them as prima facie rights. Which rights I am in fact entitled to, I 
can only know in the concrete circumstances, when looking at exercising them in 
any given case. Only then, all things considered, the real dimension of that 
freedom is determined, as well as the character and the nature of the content of 
those rights—i.e. the goods relating to them, the kind of inter-subjective 
relationship called into question, and the outcome of any conflicts of rights (final 
rights). However, no static conception of positivity can go that further. Those who 
defend such a conception are happy with those rights being envisaged by 
statutes—in the first instance, constitutional ones and protected by legal 
remedies. Before getting to this level of implementation, strictly speaking, there 
would be no human rights yet, but rather a pre-legal entity that would represent 
them at an incubating stage. Without laws, there would be no rights. 
However, passing a statute that contains human rights not only 
does not exhaust such a process of implementation, but not even represents its 
only and necessary starting point. As already mentioned, the first step towards 
the implementation of human rights has been made already when states and the 
international community have recognized that human rights must be protected, 
despite the lack of legal remedies. In the frame of practical reason, knowledge is 
functional to action. Acknowledging that something is good, already implies a 
commitment towards its realization (bonum faciendum est). Instantiating those 
rights constitutes already the first step of their implementation. Of course, such a 
process may come to a halt, and we know that this is what happens too often. 
But we can always claim that unfulfilled commitments shall be satisfied. The 
fallacy of implementation is not explained by the fact that the implementation of 
human rights is not sufficiently distinguished from their instantiation (that is judged 
enough for them to exist, in accordance to the theory of inherence) —as argued 
by Morsink. Rather, the fallacy consists in not acknowledging the “practical” reach 
of an abstract recognition of those rights. Analogously, the theory of the inherence 
of human rights – that they are acknowledged just in virtue of being human, also 
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known as the theory of natural rights, can be judged to fall into the “fallacy of the 
origin”. Such a fallacy consists of a kind of ethical objectivism that does not give 
any weight to the views of those for which something has value, or is valuable. 
As a result, such a conception is unable to acknowledge that recognizing those 
rights is already a principle of action. 
Human rights are a process of positivization from start to end, from 
their recognition to their full implementation. Practical reason follows a series of 
subsequent determinations, starting already at the stage of the apprehension of 
the good to be implemented and its formulation. The specific identity of human 
rights, compared to other families of rights, is rightly expressed in terms of them 
being able to be fully understood only as a product of practical reason. 
 
 
4. Human Rights as a Social Practice 
 
For the above-mentioned reasons, I have often argued that human 
rights are a social practice, in accordance with the theorization of it made by its 
most famous proponent, Alasdair MacIntyre.17 This might sound inconsistent, as 
MacIntyre himself judges human rights to be fanciful creations of the 
Enlightenment—like unicorns. Evidence in support of this view is, as MacIntyre 
himself argues, that there is no record of any such rights—which human beings 
should have, just in virtue of being humans, until the 15th century (MACINTYRE, 
2007, p. 69). However, it is clear that MacIntyre has mistakenly identified human 
rights with the natural rights of modernity, and in that respect, he is right in judging 
them as not classifiable as a social practice. But this is a mistake. Human rights 
are not an abstract conceptualization, rather a transversal cultural creation of our 
times, supported by a historical consciousness triggered by the experience of the 
most serious breaches of justice and hideous violations of human dignity. They 
can also be taken as an instance of jus gentium of our times. 
If we adopt the paradigm of social practice in order to better 
understand the nature of human rights, then we must look at the practice itself to 
tackle the subject of their foundation. Under this perspective, this issue can be 
seen in a quite different light than the one offered by the traditional approach. 
                                                 
17 See Trujillo; Viola (2014, p. XI-XIV). 
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First of all, the existence of social practice is justified by the fact 
itself of observing that the practice is actually operating. On that basis, we must 
be careful when talking of a foundation: the core issue becomes the correct 
exercise of the practice in question, i.e. its implementation in the best possible 
way or its striving towards excellence. The foundation is called into question not 
just with regard to the existence, rather for allowing the exercise itself of human 
rights. Therefore, Norberto Bobbio’s (1990, p. 16) statement—that protecting 
human rights is more important than justifying them, is still indirectly mirroring that 
traditional foundationalism. Experience has widely shown that protecting human 
rights necessarily triggers a debate on their foundation or justification. 
With this regard, not only do we need to identify the constitutive 
elements of social practices but also, we need to shape a virtuous interaction 
among them. Social practices are made of cooperative behaviours, belonging to 
a shared horizon, intentional participation to this shared enterprise, a series of 
somewhat official interpretations and implementations of the rules, and, last but 
not least, values that shape those ends around which the practice has been 
woven and established. 
Each one of these elements has got its own test of validity and 
effectiveness. Cooperative behaviours, which give substance to the practice, will 
be observed, intentions inferred, interpretations monitored, arguments tested, 
rules that are going to be followed will be ascertained, and rules which have in 
fact been complied with, will be determined ex-post, while values and ends will 
be justified. Each one of these “foundations” will have its own internal criterion of 
validity and effectiveness, but the practice in itself does not lie in any of them 
individually taken. The practice is the result of their historical convergence and 
interaction. 
Of course, values and ends enjoy a privileged role, insofar as they 
represent the raison d’être of the practice of human rights, the element that 
provides an identity to the practice itself. Their justification is still open to the 
ontological view, which takes into account the human being as such, as well as 
to the epistemological view, which relies on them to be self-evident, and to the 
political and institutional view, which finds in them in any case some human will 
at play. Human rights are recognized just in virtue of being humans, or based on 
the nature of government and political society? This debate is still open, and far 
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from begin exhausted. At any rate, if we keep ourselves on the sheer level of 
values, we will not be able to label them as rights any more than by metonymy. 
Declaring the existence of fundamental values connected to human dignity is not 
enough for real human rights to be there. We must locate that statement in a 
practical context, even if at an embryonic stage. Therefore, we can accept the 
view that human rights exist insofar as they are in fact implemented, but if we 
also acknowledge that their recognition and protection are “due”. But does this 
mean that, if recognition and protection were completely withdrawn, strictly 
speaking, we would not have “human rights” anymore? Exactly! Although they 
would still be natural rights, to be labelled also as “moral” rights, duties not 
recognized and unfulfilled, and most importantly serious violations of human 
dignity. 
The practice of human rights is a major historical endeavour, aimed 
at humanizing the world of human beings and adjusting it to the practical task of 
respecting their dignity. 
 
 
5. Human Rights and Jus Gentium 
 
The thesis according to which human rights are a social legal 
practice, started and supported by a historical awareness of extreme iniquities 
and violations of human dignity, points at their parallel with jus gentium, which is 
the topic of this section. Here the core aim is to test the idea that human rights 
are a component of (current) jus gentium. The assumption is that jus gentium is 
part of the legal practice and, even before, that it exists as such in our days. Jus 
gentium seems to be a topic of the past, yet it comes back from time to time. The 
guess is that jus gentium plays a crucial role in some legal crossroads, but it 
recedes to the backstage in other times, in particular, in epochs of consolidation 
and formalization of legal systems as a step in the so-called process of 
positivization. It does not disappear completely because it belongs to the very 
dynamic of law as a social practice. The hypothesis is that jus gentium is a sort 
of the first stage in the process of building a legal practice as an answer to a 
demand of coordination or about the conditions of legal interaction. In this first 
legal stage it is easier to see not only how concrete and specific claims of justice 
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move the legal articulation of rules and procedures, but also that their same 
formulation in legal terms is already in itself an answer for those demands of 
justice. As a primeval law, jus gentium is tentative and only some of the best 
answers (nowadays we would say the best practices) will subsist and progress 
towards a more established form of law, generally through the effort of 
implementing rule of law's requirements. Both the original contacts with real 
social demands and the process of formalization are necessary for legal practice. 
In fact, a law that loses its roots in specific social dynamics and a law that does 
not reach a good pattern of formalization could be considered defective. 
In order to realize the purpose of this second part, it will be 
necessary to test some of the main elements of jus gentium, trying to identify its 
nature and goals. This will be done along the way, instead of sequentially.18 In 
this perspective, it is worth anticipating that, on the one hand, human rights would 
not cover entirely the area of what can be called jus gentium in our world, but a 
relevant portion related to the treatment of human beings. On the other hand, and 
because of the nature of jus gentium, that is law in its objective sense, human 
rights might be considered under the point of view of a practice taken as a whole 
characterized by its goal (the protection of human beings), rather than a collection 
of subjective individual rights to claim for, in accordance with the first part of the 
article. 
If there is any jus gentium, it is a law appliable to all or almost all 
people, in other words, a law universally valid. Roman jurists distinguished it from 
natural law and civil law.19 In the latter case, the difference was that civil law was 
the law of the city of Rome, a law valid for a specific people, whereas jus gentium 
extends beyond the people to gentes (other peoples). This is the reason why jus 
gentium has been historically referred to the international field, even if for Roman 
jurists jus gentium regards also private relationships (contracts, obligations, 
property), in addition to (international) relationships with other gentes (diplomatic 
customs, jus ad bellum and jus in bello). The progressive identification of jus 
gentium and international law—until the apparent dissolution of the former in the 
latter in modern times—started with the use of the idea of jus gentium as a law 
                                                 
18 There are many kinds of research on different aspects of the current emergence of jus gentium 
in the law of merchants, in the criminal responsibility of individuals, in the use of foreign law, as 
an international theory of justice, famously Rawls (1999). An introduction on different aspects of 
this presence in Clark (1919).  
19 Gaio, Digest, 1, 1, 1, 9; Ulpiano, Digest, 1,1, 4 (IUSTINIANUS IMPERATOR, 1908). 
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inter gentes of a communitas orbis proposed by Francisco de Vitoria20 (16th 
century). Thanks to Alberigo Gentili, Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and Emer 
de Vattel, at the time of the consolidation of states as the main legal actors in the 
context of a Westphalian model of international relationships, jus gentium did 
become the first form of modern international law as a law interstates. With this 
development, nevertheless, jus gentium has been doubly reduced, since, on the 
one hand, as it has been said, Roman jus gentium was relevant also for private 
relationships and for what we would call public domestic law, and, on the other 
hand, it was the law of a universal community, and not only the law among states. 
Paradoxically, even if jus gentium was recognized as the forefather of modern 
international law, the Westphalian phase of international law was one of the ages 
of jus gentium's eclipse. The first question to be examined is the kind of 
universality of jus gentium and its comparison with that of human rights. 
The second perspective to be scrutinized concerns the relationships 
between jus gentium and natural law. The Roman tripartition of law in jus gentium, 
jus naturale, and jus civile indicates clearly that they do not overlap, even if the 
question of the positive or natural character of jus gentium has been the object of 
countless discussions throughout history. The main opinion since the Medieval 
Age is that jus gentium is positive law (AQUINAS, 1911-1925),21 or, according to 
Vitoria (2018 [1557]),22 a law more positive than natural. Vitoria’s ambiguous 
statement shows an important line of reasoning that leads to the third facet to be 
examined: jus gentium is a positive law grounded widely on consensus. It can 
change and evolve as positive law does, but it is referred to as a common 
understanding of what is right and just. Jus gentium and jus naturale do not 
overlap but they are in some way related to each other. If they exist, jus gentium 
ought to be consistent with jus naturale. Jeremy Waldron, in his famous article on 
foreign law and jus gentium, explains that the difference between jus naturale 
and jus gentium is that the latter does not consist of theories and ideas about 
justice to be applied to positive law—as rationalist natural law theories use to 
conceive natural law—but it consists of what law had actually achieved in its 
                                                 
20 The author speaks of an international community with an immanent authority for creating equal 
and universal laws. His main work is available in Relectiones Theologicae XII (2018 [1557]), at 
The School of Salamanca. A Digital Collection of Sources: 
<https://id.salamanca.school/texts/W0013> 
21 In: Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 57, a. 3. 
22 In: Comentarios a la Secunda Secundae de Santo Tomás, q. 57, a. 3. 
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history worldwide, accumulating shared insights on rights and justice 
(WALDRON, 2005). In this sense, jus gentium can be correctly said a common 
law of civilization (MARITAIN, 1986, p. 54). This definition does not preclude the 
possibility of mistakes and injustices. Roman jurists, for instance, brought back 
slavery and private property to jus gentium—, and these matters are (and were) 
manifestly contended. In her last book on the cosmopolitan tradition, Martha 
Nussbaum suggests that Grotius’ preference for natural law and his criticisms 
against jus gentium were precisely motivated by jus gentium’s dependence on 
cultural and historical reasons. This rooting in history explains how sometimes 
jus gentium violates moral law (NUSSBAUM, 2019, p. 113-118).23  
 
 
6. The Universality of Jus Gentium and Human Rights 
 
Since its beginning, jus gentium deals with elements of foreignness, 
and in this sense is a law able to handle relationships beyond borders. Even as 
a body of law attempting to provide Roman merchants with suitable legal tools 
for commercial exchanges with non-Romans, it implied the relationships among 
individuals belonging to different peoples.24 This feature was at the same time 
amplified and reduced when jus gentium became a body of law that governed 
relationships among states. It was amplified because it involved all the states, 
and it was reduced because it concerned only the states. On the contrary, the 
universality of jus gentium would start as the possibility of going beyond borders, 
but it points at a universal sphere of influence, applicable to the whole of 
humanity, and this was the main Vitoria's contribution to international law as the 
law of a communitas orbis. The more importance is given to interstates 
relationships, the less salience must be recognized to jus gentium for individual 
relationships, making universality a feature related to just one class of actors, the 
                                                 
23 Nussbaum (2019) seems to share with Grotius the idea that natural law is a moral theory, 
whereas being a sort of law, natural law should be distinguished from moral theories tout court. 
At least, natural law should be considered a moral theory for the law.  
24 Jus gentium was administered by the praetor peregrinus between peregrini (foreigners) or 
between Romans and peregrini. Its role was to make possible the interaction among citizens and 
foreigners. The task of the praetor peregrinus was to accommodate and simplify the civil rules 
in ways accessible to those who were not part of Rome. They did soften the forms and 
preferred the substance of the case. For this reason, even Romans chose to solve their 
conflicts under jus gentium. The praetor peregrinus was created when Rome conquered 
Sicily, in particular in the West part of the island, which was occupied by Phoenicians.   
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states. This is the reason why some authors support the idea that only the post-
World War II has set the pre-conditions for a very law of Nations that can be 
brought back to jus gentium. The existence of jus cogens, a law valid for the 
international community as a whole, has been identified as the main indicator of 
jus gentium 's revival (BOUDREAU, 2012, p. 27). Here the idea is that jus gentium 
is a law to which all the states are obliged to, even beyond their will or acceptance. 
This view tends to suggest the assimilation of international law, jus cogens, and 
jus gentium, that it is neither the necessary conclusion of this analysis nor a good 
description of current international law. What can perhaps be said is that current 
international law is more similar to the old Roman jus gentium than the 
international law of the Westphalian style. A key reason is a presence in 
international law of mandatory and universal laws related to common goals of the 
international community, some of them associated with the protection of human 
rights. But there are also other crucial purposes, such as the protection of the 
environment. The latter and the respect of human rights are not optional and they 
restrain the content of treaties and the mechanism of reciprocity and states’ self-
protection in international law. 
The question is: in which sense are these changes related to jus 
gentium, and not only to jus cogens? The answer is that while jus cogens is a 
quality of some norms, jus gentium is a stage of the legal practice as a whole. 
The latter illustrates the physiognomy of law as a social practice, in particular in 
its capacity of extension beyond political borders. The former is a component of 
this picture. International law and jus gentium are made also by customary and 
conventional law. In that sense, also the medieval lex mercatoria, as well as its 
current version,25 that is not part of jus cogens, could be led back to jus gentium. 
It deals with demands of coordination, according to shared goals and purposes, 
to be worked at by rules and procedures compatible with differences. Then jus 
gentium has to do with the universal domain of jus cogens, but also with the more 
modest opening capacity of law as an inclusive practice of coordination.26 
If we look now at the human rights practice, and, more precisely, at 
the way in which it has been set up in the international law of human rights, it 
                                                 
25 Bibliography on jus gentium and lex mercatoria dates from more than a century ago; see Howe 
(1902). 
26 In this sense, it can be said that jus gentium gives a more inclusive picture of the law, rather 
than state law, whose specificity is determined by political membership.  
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seems that the most recurrent meaning of universality is the generality of rights 
holders. The universality of rights means certainly equality in attributing them to 
all human beings just by virtue of being human. They differ from rights of the 
citizens. Both classes are general if we understand it as the result of a universal 
quantifier (it applies to everyone in the same category). But the parameters are 
different. While the practice of human rights validates rights for human beings, 
political communities consider them as members. The protection of citizens within 
political communities could be certainly grounded on their being human, but the 
responsibility to protect those rights is typically requested to the specific 
community they belong to and because of that, and to all of them.27 Looking at 
human rights, it can be said that the key point is not only the universality of rights 
holders—that is proper of any general class—but the universality of recipients of 
duties. This element is clear in the act of birth of the new practice of human rights, 
the United Nations Universal Declaration of 1948. It is true that it recognizes a list 
of rights for everyone, but the most important point is that proclaims it “as a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations” (UN, Preamble). 
This side of universality is the very character of the practice of human rights and 
the key of the comparison with jus gentium. It is not the kind of rights holders—
that within the human rights practice admits internal differences according to their 
different statuses (children, elders, women, citizens, refugees, and so on). The 
universality of human rights is to be identified as a universal responsibility to 
protect them. The implementation of such protection could and must be canalized 
through the activity of one or more of its actors, mainly the states. It involves not 
only the responsibility of the whole humanity, nations and international 
organizations, but also civil society and every person of goodwill. That protection 
must be guaranteed equally, in other words, without discrimination. Effective and 
non-discriminatory protection of rights is the task of the practice of human rights. 
If this practice is characterized precisely by duties and responsibilities, then the 
parallel with jus gentium is viable, since the latter is a version of the law in its 
objective sense. Human rights can be said part of current jus gentium when 
understood as a practice of protection of rights. 
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The universal engagement in the protection of rights shows the 
importance of the task for the entire international community. It puts rights at the 
center of legal efforts establishing their primacy in the legal enterprise (and so it 
does not shift them simply in a practice of duties). In particular, rights prevail over 
national interests in international relations, another key of the predominance of 
conventional international law in the Westphalian model. From this point of view, 
it is easy to appreciate the core of political conceptions of rights. According to 
them, any state not only has the duty to respect and promote human rights, but 
is also legally subjected to interference by other states or entities of the 
international community in case of violations or incapacity to promote them (RAZ, 
2020). The limit of political conceptions is that rights are neither only the reflection 




7. Human Rights and Jus Naturale 
 
A second element typical of the study of jus gentium regards its 
relationship with natural law. There is no way for facing here the problem of 
natural law with its myriad of versions. But it is obvious that the different traditions 
of natural law would correspond to different versions of jus gentium. It has been 
said that in its origin and the medieval debate on the topic, jus gentium is not 
natural law, or it is more positive than natural law. In other words, jus gentium 
shares the characters of positive law rather than those of natural law. Maritain 
(1986, p. 51) explains the difference between them from an epistemological point 
of view. While natural law is known by natural reason,28 jus gentium is the result 
not of a single, but a common effort of reasoning and deliberating along the way 
of justice, and not in the abstract, but the concrete field of human actions. In this 
sense, it is the result of artificial reason. This explains why evidence of injustices 
and violations play an important role in the work of making clear what is not right 
and must not be repeated.29 Waldron (2005, p. 138) describes jus gentium as 
accumulated wisdom in rights and justice, an established body of legal insights 
                                                 
28 Maritain (1986, p. 53) speaks also of “la raison commune de l’humanité”. 
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reminding problems that have been confronted before. But the historical 
dimension is not limited to its origin, because it characterizes all the way along 
with its development. For human rights, it means not only that they have historical 
grounds and then they differ from natural rights, but also that it is precisely in this 
historical course that it is possible to see which strategies and happenings are 
convenient to the practice of protecting rights and which ones are unfaithful 
readings and implementations. On the one hand, being the practice of human 
rights a collective legal enterprise, the process of identifying its methods and 
contents is not achieved once and forever. On the other hand, it is always 
necessary to tune goals, facts, and strategies, because success is not 
guaranteed. Behind this feature, there is the dynamic version of positivization that 
has been introduced in the first part of the article. 
As the outcome of a search for justice, jus gentium is similar to jus 
naturale. But as long as that search is done through human reasoning, 
argumentation, and deliberations in history, jus gentium could depart from natural 
law. The requirements of natural law do not change, while jus gentium is more 
changeable and time-bound, and may be modified as conditions of life change. 
This possibility makes controversial jus gentium conclusions. In other words, the 
looking for justice in history is inevitably uncertain. It is the reason why along 
history jus gentium could contain legal institutions clearly unjust from the point of 
view of natural law, that means also from the point of view of more careful 
consideration. The most significant ancient example is slavery: Roman jurists 
noted that while it was for sure that it belongs to jus gentium and jus civile, slavery 
was unjust under natural law because human beings are born free. In order to 
understand this point, it is worth noticing that Roman jurists were not reasoning 
about jus naturale and jus gentium in terms of top-down relationships. They 
neither make a list of principles of natural law to be translated in positive law (jus 
gentium and jus civile) nor a list of natural rights. They were instead reasoning on 
positive law and were able to notice that a specific legal institution, even well 
consolidated and perhaps useful for the most, was legal but not just. The 
message, at the end of the day, was that positive law would look for just 
institutions, even if it does not always succeed. 
The difference between jus gentium and jus naturale could depend 
on the fact that what is evident and clear in natural law is just a very restricted 
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core of the very first principles for actions, a sort of very basic rules orienting 
human actions to do good and avoid evil.30 Beyond this threshold, everything is 
doubtful and controversial, but again this does not prevent the battle for justice. 
Jus gentium is the result of humanity’s efforts trying to discern right and wrong 
ways in its path for justice and peace. Rather than ideas and principles, it is a lab 
in which tentative solutions are tried and tested until they are settled in full positive 
law. The collective nature of this effort could make it more certain but does not 
eliminate the risk of mistakes and missteps. In the perspective of Aquinas’ 
practical reason, for instance, the two forms of deriving positive law from natural 
law were by conclusions, and by determination. If conclusions could seem difficult 
to be misleading, because of the presumptive logical strength of deductive 
reasoning, determination, i.e. the process of establishing how to implement 
natural law given the abundant range of possibilities to be followed in uncertain 
conditions, is obviously less reliable. Jus gentium’s research for justice is then 
plausibly progressive and tentative, not infallible, as well as not systematic. 
From this point of view, it is apparent that the parallel between jus 
gentium and human rights is far from being related to their translation in natural 
rights fixed on human nature. It shares with jus naturale the aim of searching for 
justice.31 The parallel between human rights and jus gentium is referred to the 
general meaning of the practice. The dynamic of this process belongs to positive 
law—in other words, to law—, not only in so far as it aims at establishing the 
practice and its implementation but also from the point of view of the search for 
the best way of interpreting and developing it. All these tasks come together in 
the international law of human rights. 
 
 
A Practice Grounded on Consensus 
 
The third character of jus gentium is the question of its being 
grounded on consensus. The tradition points at the idea of an implicit consensus 
at its origin. This consensus is linked to its customary source and confirmed 
through the application of those norms, in the form of a performative acceptance 
                                                 
30 The more basic rules are summed up in the formula “to do good and avoid evil”. 
31 Finnis (1980) affirms that respecting and promoting each person's rights is a different way of 
speaking of the common good. 
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of the rule as a correct basis for action. It is obviously not necessary that it counts 
on the consent of every actor. The virtual consent of all is enough. Some authors 
think that, once jus gentium is established, in order to abolish it, actual consent 
would be required, and that is almost impossible (VITORIA, 2018 [1557]),32 but 
this thesis is against the changeability of jus gentium. In any case, in the field of 
customary law, it is always difficult to prove that practice no longer remains 
general and consistent, and then that a customary rule is not more binding, but 
even if difficult, it is not impossible. 
The universal scope of the responsibility towards human beings 
raises the question of the ground of its normative influence. As it is well known, 
at the time of the Universal Declaration of 1948 it was said that there was a 
practical agreement on those rights, even if major disagreement about their 
foundations. In fact, most of the UN members supported the final draft of the 
Declaration, while no one voted against it. But what it is important to look at is 
that in the effort to build the practice of human rights initiated by that agreement, 
there are many clues about the common efforts for cooperating in their legal 
enterprise, not only through reiterations and international conventional law but 
also in terms of cooperating in the mechanism of implementing them as well as 
expanding their effects in the field of domestic law. And that is evident even if the 
real development of the practice needed a long time to flourish. In some way, the 
time needed for the emergence of the practice plays a positive role in the 
expectance of its endurance. But, as a legal and social practice, it needs an active 
engagement in implementation and the search for appropriate interpretive 
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